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GLYCOL TEMPERATURE CONTROL VALVh
STATEMENT
At various times during the Apollo 11 mission, the command module
glycol temperature control valve failed to control the mixed water/glycol
temperature to the required 45(±3)0 F.
DISCUSSION
Normally for low radiator outlet temperatures, the glycol tempera-
ture control valve automatically maintains the evaporator inlet tempera-
ture between 420 and 48° F (fig. 1). As the radiator outlet temperature
falls below 480 F, the glycol temperature control valve modulates open
and allows hot water/glycol to mix with the colder water/glycol, thus
maintaining the required evaporator inlet temperature. Conversely, as
the mixed water/glycol temperature increases above 42°0 F, the valve
starts to close and is completely closed when the evaporator inlet tem-
perature rises above 480 F. When the mixed water/glycol is 420 F or
less, the valve is fully open. The valve can also be operated manually
by removing power from the control circuit.
Two effects of the anomalous valve operations were experienced dur-
ing the mission. The first was noted during a portion of earth orbital
flight as well as during most of the first 15 revolutions of the moon.
As the temperature of the cold water/glycol returning from the radiators
started increasing the temperature control valve failed to control, thus
causing a premature increase in the evaporator inlet temperature. The
most severe case occurred during revolution 14 when the valve did not
close until the evaporator inlet temperature reached approximately 580 F
(fig. 2).
The second effect of the anomalous operation occurred during revolu-
tions 5, 13, and 15 (fig. 2) when the mixed water/glycol temperature de-
creased below 420 F. During revolutions 5 and 13, temperatures of 360
and 380 F, respectively, were noted before valve operation returned the
temperature to the nominal control range. During revolution 15, an under-
shoot was observed (fig. 2). About this time, the temperature inlet
switch was cycled from AUTO to MANUAL and back to AUTO and the evaporator
outlet temperature began increasing from a low of 320 F until a tempera-
ture of 450 F was reached.' During all subsequent mission phases, the
glycol temperature control valve operated satisfactorily.
2Analysis of flight data during the first effect of anomalous opera-
tion established that the valve did not stick in the maximum open posi-
tion but only failed to modulate rapidly enough to prevent a premature
increase in the water/glycol temperature.
Postflight testing demonstrated that the glycol temperature controller,
which powers the temperature control valve, functioned properly and sup-
plied correctly modulated pulses to the valve for a full range of input
temperature signals. Corresponding valve response, however, appeared
sluggish. Disassembly of the valve revealed that a bearing on the worm
gear shaft in the actuator (fig. 3) had failed.
The valve has no electrical stops so that when it is commanded full
open or closed, the motor drives the gear train into hard mechanical stops
and stalls. Analysis showed that when the gear train is driven into the
stops, the bearing is subjected to a total thrust load of 90 pounds.
The bearing is rated for 20 pounds static thrust by the bearing manufac-
turer.
Examination of the bearing pieces showed that the sudden applica-
tion of static thrust load at stall combined with poor boundary lubrica-
tion characteristics of the bearing lubricant resulted in fretting cor-
rosion of the bearing race. The wear debris then accelerated the wear
and eventually jammed one ball in the race, allowing the ball behind it
to bend the ball retainer ear (fig. 3). When several of the ball retainer
ears were bent out, the balls accumulated on one side and broke the ball
retainer. Ball pressure then forced the shield out and the bearing dis-
assembled itself.
Several identical valves have demonstrated acceptable performance
after extensive life testing. One qualification test unit was subjected
to 1300 hours of operation and wear patterns similar to those observed on
Apollo 11 were noted, but no performance degradation was observed. Addi-
tionally, four qualification test units were subjected to simulated mis-
sions and accumulated from 635 to 1660 hours with no performance degrada-
tion, and one valve was successfully subjected to over 200 hours of ground
testing with the bearing lubricant removed.
Finally, four units have been flown on Apollo 7 through Apollo 10
with no indication of performance degradation.
Analysis of the bearings from some of these units, however, revealed
the same type of wear and that the units could eventually fail in the
same mode.
If the temperature control valve should fail in flight, an existing
malfunction procedure will be used to manually position the valve to
approximately 35-percent bypass. This position will maintain a prede-
termined relationship between radiator outlet and evaporator outlet tem-
peratures that only slightly increases overall system temperatures during
periods of high heat loads.
CONCLUSION
The design allowed an application of loads which are beyond the
rated capability of the bearing.
CORRECTIVE ACTION
Valve failure will not compromise future missions because by using
an existing procedure the valve can be manually set at one position which
will meet system requirements; consequently, no corrective action is re-
quired.
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(a) Location of failed bearing.
Figure 3. - Bearing assembly within temperature control valve.
(b) Failed bearing assembly. 
Figure 3 . - Concluded. 
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